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Planning 
to Win 
Taking a Comprehensive Approach 
to Labor's Corporate Campaigns 
There are some labor debacles that keep us up nights with the 
If Onlies. No names. You know which ones they are, and why they 
went bust. 
And the real kicker is that workers lost, not because management 
was so on-target clever, but because labor seemed to be playing 
Russian Roulette with seven bullets in a six-gun. 
Which is why we love strategic campaigns. Because they show 
labor at its smartest and most effective. And because—with strong 
commitment, sound preparation, vigorous organizing and an 
uncynical devotion to social and economic justice—labor can put 
up a damn good fight and win! 
To hear some people talk, you might think the strategic or cor-
porate campaign was born yesterday, some new wonder child of 
this technological era, dependent on mysterious economic formulas 
and complex computer equations. That may be what some experts 
would have you believe, but it doesn't necessarily work that way. 
There's no question that a strategic campaign needs facts and 
figures, and some require very sophisticated concepts and numbers. 
But the most critical parts of a strategic campaign are the same 
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as for any big organizing or contract campaign—visionary leader-
ship and a fully engaged membership with a clear justice-related 
goal, a manageable plan and an iron will to win. 
FROM LABOR DISPUTE TO LA CAUSA 
In fact, for those of us in the 40-something bracket, the classic 
strategic labor campaign of our formative years was the United Farm 
Workers grape boycott of the 1960s. 
We may not have called it a corporate or strategic campaign at 
the time, but we did recognize it as something different from the 
approach taken by other unions during those weary labor decades. 
Indeed, the path Cesar Chavez walked was not initially promoted 
by supporters in the labor movement, of whom there were pain-
fully few. Rather, it came from Saul Alinsky and his Chicago brand 
of community organizing. That organizing, as Alinsky put it, is 
"the breaking down of the feeling on the part of our people that 
they are social automatons with no stake in the future, rather 
than human beings in possession of all the responsibility, strength, 
and human dignity which constitute the heritage of free citizens 
of a democracy. This can only be done through the democratic 
organization of our people . . . It is the job of building People's 
Organizations." 
The Alinsky school of organizing said that indigenous leadership 
must be recognized and nurtured, so that people could do for them-
selves, rather than be done for. Alinsky also taught that the source 
of power in any given situation must be clearly identified, and a 
strategy created to change that power dynamic in your favor. In 
the process, he encouraged innovative, frequently disruptive tactics 
and skillful use of media to magnify the impact of public action. 
Cesar Chavez took those precepts and brought them to bear on 
the injustices and abuses confronting California farmworkers. The 
farmworker struggle trained thousands of organizers, pulled leaders 
out of the fields, targeted certain vineyards over others, built coali-
tions that went deep into religious and intellectual communities, 
made allies of supermarket shoppers in every state, and challenged 
the morality of a nation. This wasn't merely a strike by disgruntled 
employees, it was "La Causa"—The Cause. The poster remains a 
movement classic. The message? Not, "Unfair to labor" but rather, 
"There's Blood on these Grapes!" 
The seeds of La Causa have been sown throughout the labor 
movement and, in fact, today's strategic campaign has roots in that 
historic struggle. 
/ 
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LRR F O C U S : W h a t is a St ra teg ic C a m p a i g n ? 
Because of experimentation by various unions over the past 
decade, we can, with some accuracy, define the characteristics of 
a strategic, or corporate campaign. They are: 
(1) an all-out effort to resolve a conflict with management to the 
benefit of workers; 
(2) by exploiting the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the speci-
fic employer; 
(3) through tactics dictated by all available information about the 
employer and the unique situation; 
(4) that maximizes the mobilization and participation of a resolute, 
militant union membership; 
(5) and involves the media, public, customers; 
(6) in a powerful struggle that underscores social and economic 
justice. 
Understanding that companies do move production to low-wage 
regions and that strikers are permanently replaced, strategic cam-
paigners seek to minimize these risks by offering creative alternatives 
to replace or augment the conventional strike. The method employs 
all available information to develop an employer profile and an 
analysis on which to build a unique, appropriate strategy based on 
labor's best and most progressive social values. 
ADAPTATION FOR SURVIVAL 
The past two decades have, however, brought substantial shifts 
in the labor landscape. Many of them have been none too thrill-
ing. Twelve Reagan/Bush years eviscerated worker protections and 
encouraged labor scofflaws. Multinational corporations, flaunting 
the mobility of capital and the stationary status of labor, pitted the 
modest wages of American workers against the starvation wages of 
workers around the globe. Moving production offshore, and replac-
ing strikers at home, are no longer aberrations, but the norm—and 
they have been beating labor's conventional responses into 
obsolescence. 
Another significant transformation has been in the way we think 
about, and work with, information. 
Although daring workers are the guts of the strategic campaign 
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process, data is the modern day weaponry which equips us to take 
accurate aim at unscrupulous employers. 
As with most technology, the computer can be used well or badly 
in a strategic context. Consider, for example, the negative impact 
on the farmworkers of substituting direct mail for direct organiz-
ing. On the positive side, however, calculations which used to take 
days can now be conducted during a bargaining session on a laptop 
spreadsheet; leaflets, mailing labels and the like are a snap; and while 
it might still take a researcher or specialist to generate sophisticated 
financial calculations, a computer literate generalist can collect vast 
amounts of information from diverse sources in record time. 
Finally, the past 20 years have produced a new generation of labor 
staffers and specialists. These '60s kids, now pushing middle age, 
come from a variety of backgrounds but share some common defining 
experiences—the civil rights and farmworker movements among them. 
As they've jostled their way into the labor arena, they've brought their 
community-based organizing backgrounds and broad social justice 
concerns with them. Coincidentally, they are also the first generation 
of labor leaders to grasp the potential of personal computers. 
Put all these ingredients together, shake them up, and today's 
strategic campaign tumbles out. 
A CAST OF CHARACTERS 
Over the past dozen years or so, roughly an equal number of 
individuals have gained a reputation as strategic campaign experts. 
Ray Rogers added the term 'corporate campaign" to the labor 
lexicon, when he pioneered the technique of disrupting an employ-
er's financial relationships and targeting boards of directors, in the 
winning struggle by the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
(ACTWU) against the southern textile giant J.P. Stevens. Today, such 
efforts may variously be called "corporate," "strategic" or "compre-
hensive" campaigns. 
Later, as head of Corporate Campaign, Inc., Rogers shepherded 
the fight of UFCW Local P-9 against Hormel which, while unsuc-
cessful in conventional terms, became a symbol of labor resistance 
in the '80s. 
Two other ACTWU staffers, David Dyson and William Paterson, 
were instrumental in the American component of a strategic cam-
paign across international borders to assist workers at a Coca-Cola 
plant in Guatemala. By focusing international scrutiny on the brutal 
repression of workers and the murders of union leaders, and insti-
gating a credible boycott threat against Coke, the campaign forced 
/ 
Labor's Corporate Campaigns 13 
Coca-Cola to intervene, leading to new franchise ownership of the 
Guatemala plant and survival of the union. 
Richard Leonard at the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers union 
crafted a campaign against the German chemical multinational, 
BASF, that featured unprecedented cooperation between workers 
here and in South Africa. Most recently, he clubbed American 
Home Products in its scheme to move jobs to Puerto Rico by abus-
ing the U.S. IRS Tax Code 936. 
Ron Carver, a veteran of the civil rights movement, has con-
tributed a special focus on community-based coalitions and social 
justice concerns. Working with UE Local 277 in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, Carver's coalition won a 13 week strike against the 
Morse Cutting Tool division of Gulf & Western by confronting 
G&W's socially destructive disinvestment policies. Carver now heads 
the Strategic Campaigns Office at the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters. 
Harking back to CIO legacy of the '30s, the UAW's Jerry Tucker 
devised strategic in-plant campaigns at Moog Automotive and LTV. 
Where other tactics failed, Tucker's use of Work to Rule on the shop 
floor forced a contract settlement. The concept was strikingly 
simple. Workers performed their jobs to the absolute letter of con-
tract and company rules, without any additional hours or initiative. 
Productivity plummeted—and the companies conceded. Tucker and 
Ray Rogers have recently been assisting AIW Local 837 workers in 
applying similar tactics against Midwest corn processor A.E. Staley. 
Cesar Chavez showed how humanity and morality is the basis for all labor 
struggles. 
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Even the AFL-CIO houses noteworthy strategic campaigners. Joe 
Uehlein of the Industrial Union Department and Jeff Fiedler at 
the Food and Allied Service Trades Department have helped 
affiliates tackle a wide variety of hostile employers. 
David Chu has done similar work at SEIU on a range of projects, 
most recently generating strategies to tackle commercial real estate 
developers as part of the highly visible J for J campaign. 
And in a memorable synthesis of management confrontation and 
labor culture, Eddie Burke guided the UMWA's campaign against 
Pittston. That highly publicized effort not only enabled miners to 
persevere, but brought thousands of allies from around the nation 
and the world to Camp Solidarity in Virginia. 
Whether acting in the role of in-house staff or consultants, these 
strategists tend to be of a breed. First, they are primarily white males 
formed, at least in part, by the movement and cultural influences 
of the '60s. Second, even though they sometimes bicker about 
strategies, they share some distinctive characteristics. To put it 
bluntly, they are smart, pushy, resourceful, intuitive, inventive, 
intense, driven and, some may say, semi-insane. 
When pressed, both these strategic campaign experts and local 
campaign participants acknowledge that the chemistry between the 
campaign strategist and local leaders can have a major impact on 
the success of a campaign. It seems to require the right kind of 
"outsider" and the right "insiders" to make it all come together. 
In this context, outsider does not mean those outside the labor 
movement but rather outside the daily routine. 
The outsider tends to bring a fresh eye to sort and interpret infor-
mation—and a single-mindedness that is harder to achieve if you 
are surrounded by the demands of your normal relationships. 
But without committed union leaders and activists at the scene 
of the conflict, success is unlikely. The insiders have the relation-
ship webs and political bases required for a good campaign. They 
can mobilize fellow unionists and neighbors, and have a deep com-
mitment to the community that precedes, and outlasts, that of any 
outsider. On the other hand, although the right insiders can launch 
a campaign without an outsider, the best efforts involve an intangi-
ble synthesis between the two perspectives. 
EASY RYDER 
Strategic campaigns are increasingly viewed, not as an oddity, but 
as a critical necessity if unions are to powerfully protect worker 
interests against global corporate renegades, privatization and 
'* 
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diminished respect for human values in the workplace. 
Last year, propelled by the discouraging results of a conventional, 
and often corrupt, approach to bargaining, newly elected Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters President Ron Carey established 
a Strategic Campaigns Office in his union. 
Backed by the formidable resources of the International, the new 
department worked closely with union leadership and membership 
to rack up four strategic victories in record time. A look at two of 
them—the resolution of the national carhaul contract and settle-
ment of a dispute against Lohrs, an Anheuser-Busch beer distributor 
in St. Louis, Missouri—provides a sense of texture and suggests 
some principles that help turn a tough struggle into a strategic 
campaign. 
When Carey came into office in early 1992, he was immediately 
faced with the challenge of settling the carhaul contract which 
had expired eight months earlier—and affected more than 16,000 
Teamsters who transport new cars from auto plants, ports and 
railheads to dealerships. Among the issues was doublebreasting 
—the practice of shifting union jobs to parallel non-union outfits 
owned by the same employer. 
In strategic campaigns, it's good to get the jump on the employer 
with advance preparation. However, in this case, contract talks had 
already been dragging on for months, and two contract proposals 
had already been rejected by the membership. 
As International VP Tom Gilmartin, out of a Teamster local in 
Hartford, noted, "It was clear that the Teamsters union was reluc-
tant to strike the carhaulers, primarily because of their ability to 
permanently replace strikers. Prior to Carey's election, we had been 
trying to talk the carhaulers to death—and it wasn't getting us 
anywhere." 
Carey reviewed the carhaul contract morass and quickly commit-
ted to two crucial decisions. First, Carey decided to specifically 
target Ryder, a publicly held corporation with the largest share (25%) 
of the carhaul business. Second, the IBT went after the most 
vulnerable, rather than the most obvious, parts of Ryder's far-flung 
empire: retail truck rental outlets and school bus franchises, rather 
than the actual carhauling division. 
"The Carey Administration had to succeed with a contract in 
carhaul," said one Teamster official, "and Ryder was the biggest com-
pany, which made it desirable to crack them first. 
"But there was a lot of internal debate about how to target them. 
Some advisors thought the key was in the auto industry; if only 
we could get UAW President Owen Bieber to talk with GM and 
• 
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In a public show of support, Jobs with Justice members rally with the 
Teamsters outside Ryder's Miami headquarters. 
get them to cancel their contract with Ryder's non-union subsidiaries, 
we'd have some leverage. When you stop to think about it, that's 
pretty farfetched. 
''Some other advisors thought we ought to focus on mob ties 
between the double-breasted operations and their labor contractors. 
But, in fact, that story had already been covered in Business Week 
a year earlier, with virtually no consequences." 
So Teamster researchers took another look at the available data. 
In a new review of the Ryder annual report, several things stood out. 
First, the company owned or franchised 5,500 consumer truck rental 
outlets, located predominantly in metro areas with a large Teamsters 
membership. This afforded opportunities to mobilize lots of members 
and provided the capacity to escalate the battle, if need be. Second, 
Ryder had allocated millions of dollars in marketing to catch up with 
U-Haul. Therefore, a Teamster attack in this area would jeopardize 
Ryder's plans for expansion. Further research in the business press 
confirmed this. 
The annual report also suggested that school bus transport was 
a potential growth area, and also susceptible to attack. 
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' T h e report said they transported 400,000 kids a day in 18 states, 
and were Number Two in North America" said one Teamster official. 
"Also, they have to appear before public bodies to get approval for 
new and renewal contracts in cities where we have political influence 
and members on those public boards. We decided to go for it." 
Based on these two critical targeting decisions, the union employed 
several tactics. 
For instance, the Teamsters zeroed in on the Doral/Ryder Golf 
Open in South Florida, adjacent to Ryder's corporate headquarters. 
The IBT hired a plane from the Aerial Sign Company to fly over the 
tournament with a sign reading, "Justice for Ryder Employees." 
And the boss reacted. In fact, Ryder went overboard, apparently 
convincing FAA airport authorities to prohibit the plane from flying. 
They also sent a "corporate security specialist" to pressure the plane 
owner to cancel his contract with the Teamsters. A Mr. Christopher 
Ferrante of Control Consultants Inc. materialized at the Aerial Sign 
Company Terminal, offered to buy out their entire fleet for that 
afternoon, and asserted that the Doral fly-over would be stopped 
by authorities. 
This produced an unanticipated ally for the Teamsters: Aerial Sign 
Company owner James Butler. 
"It appeared that Ryder was pulling out all the stops to get this 
fly-over squashed " he relates. "My position is that labor unions have 
as much right as management to be heard, and those rights are guar-
anteed by the First Amendment. To me, it was basically a new-style 
picket. If they have the right to hold up a sign, they should have 
the right to hire the airplane." 
Although the fly-over was prohibited by the FAA, the Teamsters 
certainly caught Ryder engaging in questionable behavior and, with 
the local ACLU chapter, brought the issue of freedom of speech into 
the fight. 
The Teamsters provided another morally-based focus for the com-
munity by challenging Ryder to distinguish itself from the unsavory 
labor practices of Eastern Airlines which, like Ryder, was based in 
Miami—an example still vivid to many local people. 
President Carey took another unorthodox step. He invited Wall 
Street trucking industry analysts and industry press to a breakfast brief-
ing session, where he presented a clear description of the campaign. 
"The results were great," said one aide. "The reporters and 
analysts wrote stories informing shareholders that a serious cam-
paign was in progress. This follows the logic of choosing a public 
company, where the stockholders have a vested interest in how these 
issues are resolved." 
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The union involved other constituencies on other fronts. The 
Teamsters moved the school bus battle beyond ordinary union 
concerns when they initiated a computer search that revealed that 
Ryder school bus drivers in dozens of cities had jeopardized 
children's safety. This information provided the basis for commu-
nity coalitions with concerned parents groups and threatened 
Ryder's ability to win public school bus contracts. 
In addition, targeting the truck rental franchises yielded real 
results. Beginning with 100 locations the first week, and doubling 
the number each week thereafter, the Teamsters made Ryder feel 
the pressure. 
A rally and picket line co-sponsored by CWA and Jobs With Justice 
at Ryder's Miami headquarters—combined with a strategically timed 
print ad in which labor, civil rights and women's rights groups called 
on Ryder to uphold community standards—reinforced the message. 
Franchise managers flooded Ryder headquarters with phone calls 
about the picketers, demanding answers. This was particularly 
troubling to Ryder. Most distributors make their primary income 
as gas stations, with truck rental as an auxiliary business. They can 
easily switch their rental operation to a Ryder competitor. 
"The campaign grew until we were leafletting more than 600 
locations," says Teamster International VP Gilmartin. 
' T h e idea of dealerships all over the country calling Ryder, 
complaining, wondering what's going on, had a very clear impact. 
You can measure that simply by where negotiations were before 
the campaign, and where they ended up—with an agreement that 
included precedent-setting language to limit double-breasting and 
subcontracting of union work." 
Gilmartin adds that it also had a positive impact on the union. 
"At least for the Teamsters movement, on a national level, this was 
something very new. Initially, some leaders were very interested, 
others were very skeptical. But as the campaign progressed, people 
became more receptive. They saw it as an effective tool." 
Seventy days after Carey took office, a new carhaul agreement 
was signed. 
DON'T CRY IN YOUR BEER 
The Anheuser-Busch campaign, though local and smaller, 
produced another large win for the Teamsters. 
The St. Louis local had been stalemated against Lohrs, an 
Anheuser-Busch beer distributor, for more than a year. Once again, 
the International Union was called in. 
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Gary Scott is president of Teamster Local 133 in St. Louis, repre-
senting the beer distribution drivers. "A year or two before this cam-
paign," Scott reports, "we chose to strike over a distributor contract, 
and 52 people were permanently replaced, lost their jobs. 
"We chose not to do that this time. But after reaching agreements 
with all our other distributors, we were unable to get a fair con-
tract with Lohrs. We tried to go on a personal attack against the 
Lohr family. One of them sat on a local bank board, for example, 
and we tried to disrupt that link. But we weren't getting a response, 
and nothing was generating public interest." 
The question of whether a campaign should be framed as a 
personal attack on an individual employer is actually an area of sharp 
controversy among strategic campaign practitioners. 
Nothing makes members feel better than to badmouth the boss 
or picket his house—and few bosses are sanguine about the intru-
sion of demonstrators into their private lives. Sometimes it even 
has some dividends: Eastern Airlines President Frank Lorenzo 
emerged from the Eastern fray appearing both economically and 
mentally unstable. 
However, other strategic campaigners are not enamored of this 
approach. As one of them noted, "At some point you have to settle, 
and this tactic makes it tough. Also, I always try to isolate the com-
pany within the larger business community, and a personal attack 
frequently encourages them to stick together. Most important, when 
you go for the easy 'feel good' maneuver, it almost always means 
you're bypassing a more important, more resonant social justice issue. 
It's like, after Lorenzo left, there wasn't much left of the campaign— 
and now he's back as an industry player." 
When the International Union was called in, they helped refocus 
the St. Louis campaign in two important ways. 
Targeting once more proved critical. "What made the campaign 
successful was the decision to pressure Anheuser Busch," says Scott. 
"Rather than going after the distributor, we went after the prod-
uct itself. That was a departure from the way we had done things 
before. When we used Anheuser-Busch as a target, everyone could 
relate. Neither Lohrs nor the brewery expected that." 
The new target required some readjustment for Local 133's sister 
local. "You can have guidelines, but locals will have to be very 
flexible as circumstances change," notes John Wotawa of Team-
sters Local 6, representing the Anheuser-Busch brewery workers. 
"At the time Local 133 was having problems with Lohrs, I had 
a hell of a lot of members laid off. It was tricky for me, and a 
Catch-22 for our local. We wanted to be sympathetic with the 
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St. Louis Teamsters bring the fight out to the public arena—a Cardinal's 
baseball game. Cleverly combining the game scorecard with a flyer about 
their struggle, the Teamsters upped the ante on Anheuser-Busch. 
drivers in Local 133, but our folks were also anxious about losing 
jobs. I had to convince them that we needed to take part, because 
most assuredly we would be management's next target. Anheuser-
Bush is in the business of making money, after all, they feel no moral 
obligation to us." 
The other key to success, was a powerful alliance with local tavern 
owners angered by a state law allowing monopoly on beer distri-
bution routes. The monopoly meant that while Anheuser-Busch 
enjoyed an 80 percent share of bottled beer and a 90 percent share 
of draft on its home ground of St. Louis, the product was cheaper 
across the river in Illinois. 
The Teamsters and tavern owners wanted the law changed and 
initiated a referendum campaign involving a broad community coali-
tion to bring pressure on both the distributors and the brewery. 
"It was a pretty smart move on the part of the Teamsters to get 
this referendum thing going," says Speak Easy Tavern owner Matt 
Miley. 
I 
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"As liquor retailers, the wholesaler monopoly doesn't sit right with 
us. I can buy liquor from any wholesaler, and it should be the same 
for beer. So when we were approached about repealing this legis-
lation through state referendum, we got involved. I look at it this 
way: There was something in it for me, and something in it for the 
union. It was unique in that both groups could benefit." 
Carol McKinney, the owner of the Iowa Buffet tavern, and a 
principal coalition spokesperson, saw the issues more broadly. 
"I have this little blue collar bar, and this campaign created a 
conflict" she says. "On the one hand most of my people are loyal 
to Anheuser-Busch products. At the same time, they're union 
people and wouldn't want me selling scab beer. Lohrs tried to 
pressure me. They said they'd be glad to deliver the beer at night, 
and all kinds of other unethical things. 
"I felt the only way to deal with it was to get my voice out there. 
The biggest obstacle is time. We all have great intentions, but 
people have a hard time finding the time. But I had the moral and 
emotional support of my clientele and the support of the other 
tavern owners. 
"There's a lot more to it than just a union issue. People have got 
to start taking care of each other. Our whole system and our whole 
society is diminishing because we don't take care of each other." 
The union's concerns also drew wide political support. "The 
Teamsters understand the need for labor-community alliance," says 
St. Louis Alderman Ken Jones, who chairs the 11-member Black 
Caucus of Aldermen. 
Jones sponsored a hearing which highlighted disputes between 
beer delivery drivers and Anheuser-Busch not just in St. Louis, but 
in Houston and Detroit as well. "What this alliance means to me 
is that the union will support the community on social issues that 
matter to us, and the community will support the economic issues 
of the union on the picket line," Jones explained. 
"I'm not a moralist, I'm a materialist. But I think there must be 
a meshing of the two." 
The union also used the fight to publicize the firing of Isaiah 
Hair, who was unjustly dismissed by Lohrs after 12 years. The union 
maintained that African-American drivers like Hair were subjected 
to discrimination in routes and treatment, not just locally, but in 
several cities. Leaflets featuring the words of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. focused on similar problems in Houston. 
But the union didn't simply concentrate on the issues, it also 
engaged the membership. One of the most successful actions was 
leafletting at Busch stadium. 
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"It got everybody involved," relates Local 133 President Gary 
Scott. "It was peaceful, it was easy to do. We're just a few blocks 
from the stadium, and we could carpool people. It was only for an 
hour or so before the game, so it didn't involve a lot of time. Yet 
we could reach thousands of people a night. We handed out 20,000 
leaflets at each game—and got good media coverage too." 
As one campaigner put it, "In most cases, leafletting beats 
newspaper advertising. It doesn't waste money, which is scarce, and 
it maximizes our most valuable resource, the members. You also 
get to look someone in the eye and make a personal appeal. It gives 
a human face to the message." 
The combination of smart targeting, a strong community coali-
tion and a clear social justice message to the community worked. 
Lohrs settled—and Isaiah Hair returned to work. 
THE 12 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC CAMPAIGNS 
So there you are, with a monster employer threatening to 
demolish you. What is it that elevates your average ho-hum union 
struggle into a gutsy and noteworthy strategic campaign? 
A look at the Ryder and Anheuser-Busch campaigns suggests 
some principles that can make the difference. The tactics will 
change with the employer and situation, but the underlying precepts 
by which to evaluate your progress remain constant. 
1. Seize the initiative. Like the Boy Scouts, be prepared. If you're 
going into a tough conflict or strike, it's critical to think ahead of 
time, "If we go out, what could we do to exert enough pressure 
to win it?" 
Although some campaigns require hundreds of hours of research, 
more often the key information about company finances is in the 
annual report, 10-K S.E.C. forms, business press reports and other 
easily available material. At the very least, these will point you in 
the right strategic direction. 
2. Map the big picture. Draw a map of all the relationships your 
employer has, beginning with your own. Honestly evaluate your 
position, how well you're organized, how hard it would be for him 
to find replacement labor. But don't stop there! 
Look at who owns the company, who's on the board of directors, 
who are the suppliers and customers, what regulation must the 
employer reckon with, what are the financial commitments, what 
individuals or institutions capitalize the company. 
That map will help you choose an effective strategy. 
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3. Think like the boss. By thinking like the boss—whether it's a 
tough plant closing or contract fight or some other calculated anti-
union, anti-worker effort—we can get beyond the conventional 
response they're expecting from us and make a real impact. 
Historically, we've looked at employers from our own point of 
view, in terms of his dependence on us. However, we can assume 
the boss is anticipating a certain response from the union—let's 
say a long strike—and is willing to bear the cost of that reaction. 
Nor does the willingness of a union to maintain a lengthy strike 
necessarily produce a victory. If we maintain or limit our response 
to the predictable picket line, or simply shout louder at the plant 
gate, and we don't disrupt any other financial or political relation-
ships, we're just cooperating with our own demise. 
4. Go for the higher vulnerability. Most employers are vulnerable 
somewhere, and all employers are more vulnerable in some places 
than in others. Withholding labor is only one vulnerability, not the 
exclusive one—and these days not always the most effective one. 
The decision on where to focus your attack should be made on the 
basis of weighted vulnerabilities. 
The UMWA hit the Pittston Coal Co. on all fronts in its corporate cam-
paign. The Daughters of Mother Jones led the way in the use of nonviolent 
civil disobedience when they took over the Pittston headquarters in Virginia. 
24 Labor Research Review #21 
If something is a potential or targeted growth area for a company, 
then it's probably more valuable as a target than any other unit of 
comparable size or dollar value. | 
Likewise, companies are usually more vulnerable in areas where \ 
they are subject to government regulation, where they must interact 
with the public, where the product is discretionary, or where there 
are easy alternatives. 
5. Plan to win. Your plan must be realistic and manageable. To 
mobilize the membership, things have to be reasonable, logical 
and possible. Members should be able to participate without super-
human sacrifice. If the perfect tactic is beyond your economic or 
human means, scale it back to the level you can implement. And 
you must have the likelihood of being effective. Deep down inside, 
people want badly to win and want to do what they think reasonable 
to achieve a victory. 
6. Stay flexible—clear your mind of assumptions. Successful 
campaigns are built on dozens of readjustments. 
The biggest hindrance to effective campaigns is going by rote, 
by habit, by what we're used to doing. Unions, like people, don't 
always change course in time to avoid mortal damage. 
Frequently old, ineffective ways of conducting conflicts prevail 
over new tactics. And the strategy and tactics of one strategic 
campaign will often not be effective in the next. 
Even with a good plan, it's necessary to stay flexible. A specific 
tactic may backfire, a prospective ally may evaporate. You gotta roll 
with the punches. 
7. Struggle for social justice and human rights. Cesar Chavez 
said, ' T h e fight is never about grapes and lettuce. It's always 
about people." 
So often, when we condemn the company for trying to bust the 
union, we talk like we're addressing the labor council instead of the 
public. We presume that most people think that union-busting is 
bad—and that they actually understand the implications. Those are 
risky assumptions. 
"I call it the brother-in-law test," says one campaigner, "namely, 
will the average brother-in-law get the message? And at training 
sessions, I make participants pledge never to use that old stop sign 
with a slash across the employer's name. All it tells people is that 
you don't like your employer. It's a message aimed at members only, 
it doesn't mean a hill of beans to the general public." 
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Instead, focus on the human costs of the company's irrespon-
sible social behavior. 
Let people know what the real problem is, and why the employ-
er's behavior is wrong. And do it in a way that will be understood, 
and have an impact, even on those people who don't know or care 
about unions. If we use that as a standard, we're likely to be suc-
cessful. And, in the process, people may end up knowing more— 
and caring more. 
8. The more you involve the members, the longer they can last. 
If you involve people in a struggle where they feel they have a 
chance, then their desire to win is usually enough to make them 
want to participate. And if you do it in a way that's fun, then it 
energizes people instead of draining them. 
Union staff and leaders are sometimes wary of strategic campaigns 
because they don't think the members will want to get involved. 
Their concerns may stem from the old model, where you turned 
people out simply on the basis of loyalty. The problem is that if 
you overuse loyalty, it evaporates—and you also have to pay it back 
in kind. It sometimes takes more work up front to involve members 
on the merits of the campaign itself, but it usually pays off in 
heightened membership participation as the campaign evolves and 
leaves the union stronger. 
9. Go where you are most visible. In the old days, work places were 
situated in communities, so if you put up a picket line, you could 
actually stare your neighbors in the eye and shame them not to cross. 
No more. Today communities are more fragmented, and many 
industrial work sites have moved to industrial parks, where there's 
no one to see you, no matter how many pickets you turn out. 
So go where you can deliver your message to the largest number 
of people you want to influence. Take advantage of everyday events 
like rush hour on the New York subways, or special community 
celebrations like the county fair, or make your employer squirm by 
an embarrassing demonstration at a trade show. The opportunities 
are everywhere! 
10. Make your struggle a community concern—not a labor-manage-
ment pissing match. Coalition is more than a fashionable labor 
buzzword. It is a way for the broader community to join you in con-
demning the injustices of your employer. 
To the extent that the public perceives the campaign as a labor-
management pissing match, they won't want to interfere. As ludi-
crous as it may seem to us in the labor movement, our struggle will 
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be seen as a conflict between two giants, probably equally bad, or 
as a fight too complex to understand. 
A good coalition can change that. Most unions only understand 
limited, comfortable coalitions: labor, the church and one or two 
social groupings. 
That's a good start, but not the last word. Ask, what is the natural 
coalition for this unique struggle? Then get together with those 
who are also victimized by your employer's actions, and raise hell. 
11. Escalate—and be relentless. Leave yourself some maneuver-
ing room,, a way to raise the stakes—and force the employer to 
wonder what awaits if he persists. If you have let management know 
what you intend to do, and have vigorously executed your plans, 
you can bet they'll worry. 
When you're relentless with a powerful message to the right audi-
ence, it's likely to be a real threat to the company's marketing, or 
to some other targeted vulnerability. Unless a company is suicidal, 
they'll give up before they go out of business, or lose more than 
they can later recoup. As Ray Rogers tells his audiences, a campaign 
escalates from A to Z, and most companies quit before the end. 
There is usually a moment when they just lose heart and yield. 
The problem is, you can never predict when that moment will occur. 
The trick is for you to keep heart, and continue to campaign with 
intensity, despite the uncertainty. You only have to last one day 
longer than they do! 
12. Nothing beats success—but you can never lose by putting 
up a good fight. Strategic campaigns are becoming so popular 
because they work. However, you never know how long it will take, 
and there is never a guarantee. "There's no last straw, no last tactic 
that forces the employer to capitulate," says one campaigner. "It's 
the unknown power." 
"No strike has ever been lost," Eugene Debs said, and most 
observers agree that the memory of a strong union battle fought 
for justice and human rights will outlive the pain of the loss to 
inspire future fighters. 
"I've done these a lot, and I usually win," says one campaign 
wizard. "But it's a funny thing, you can always lose." 
"I've never known for sure that I was going to win a campaign, 
and usually there are long periods where there's no indication. The 
employer doesn't give out signals, 'In two weeks, I'm going to cave 
in.' The only signposts are these principles. I use them like a check-
list, and I readjust or realign the strategy to meet them. Usually, 
if you show tenacity and put aside doubts, it works." 
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BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME 
The Teamster campaigns against Ryder and Anheuser-Busch 
brought together a revitalized and concerned International union 
and motivated local union leaders, all of whom combined skills and 
resources to develop and implement winning campaigns based on 
these principles. 
But the essence of a strategic campaign is not so easily captured. 
You need that intangible element, a combination of will, imagi-
nation and spirit that some individual, or group of individuals, must 
bring to the process. 
To succeed, we must be on the lookout for those folks in every 
shop and every local, and then provide them with the support to 
move forward. 
"The big thing we learned from the Anheuser-Busch experience 
is that this type of campaign can work/' says Local 133 President 
Gary Scott. "We learned that a lot of minds can come up with 
different ideas and approaches, and that members will get involved. 
Next time, we'll have even more participation because we were 
successful. We won a battle we didn't think we'd be able to win. 
"I think it just comes with experience. Do I think I could do one 
without the International? Yes, as long as they were in the back-
ground to assist." 
International VP Tom Gilmartin says that the Ryder campaign 
has changed his approach in his own Hartford local. "The campaign 
had an immediate impact on me. In the 10 years I've been a 
Business Agent, striker replacement has become the norm. I now 
do all my negotiations with an alternative strategy in mind. I develop 
my position, I involve the members in planning, coordinating and 
mapping out the strategy. The bottom line is I saw it as effective." 
Gilmartin also believes that the principles of strategic campaigns 
can be transmitted to new practitioners. "I love the guys who do 
these campaigns," he laughs. "They're creative, and energetic and 
they have this sensitivity to the public viewpoint that makes them 
on target about strategy. It's amazing. They're sometimes more in 
touch with the communities than we are. 
"But it can be taught. Like most lessons, you learn more by doing 
than listening. You gotta listen. But then you gotta go out there 
and do" • 
